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INTRODUCTION
Humans are well adapted to their social
environments. Experimental evidence sug-
gests that humans are either born with,
or quickly learn, the necessary affective
and cognitive processes that allow them
to recognize others, and to understand
their mental states and social behavior.
Mori’s (1970) proposal of an uncanny
valley, which describes affective response
as a function of distance from a human
category defined by morphological and
behavioral features (i.e., human likeness),
appears to be a sensible extension of these
ideas. Following Mori’s initial proposal,
the uncanny valley has largely been con-
sidered in the context of cultural arti-
facts such as robotics, prosthetics, toys,
and puppets. He associated “healthy peo-
ple” with the greatest level of familiar-
ity and positive affect, prosthetic hands
and corpses with a global negative affec-
tive maximum, and bunraku puppets and
humanoid robots with intermediate lev-
els of familiarity and positive affect. It
is important to note that these cultural
artifacts represent the most contemporary
features of human societies. The uncanny
valley likely depends on extensions of pre-
potent responses to stimuli via general
learning mechanisms (e.g., face recogni-
tion; Haxby et al., 2002; Sperber and
Hirschfeld, 2004). Empirical studies of the
uncanny valley have just begun to explore
the authenticity of Mori’s proposal.
Contemporary studies examining the
uncanny valley hypothesis have drawn
heavily on the psychological literature to
explain these phenomena. The shift from
an account of the uncanny valley based
on a dimension of human-likeness to
that of categorization and frequency-based
exposure (Burleigh and Schoenherr, 2014)
suggests that classes of cultural artifacts
might provide evidence for the ubiquity
of phenomena across cultures and within
human history. These social representa-
tions can become external representations
available to all members of a human
group and can thereby increase familiarity
and anchor human judgments (Moscovici,
1981). Supporting Mori’s initial claim,
negative responses are the result of a lack of
familiarity (e.g., Burleigh and Schoenherr,
2014) that emerge over the course of devel-
opment (Lewkowicz and Ghazanfar, 2012)
as humans’ affective systems have yet to
adapt to these artifacts. If the uncanny
valley does have a general cognitive basis,
then evidence from affective, behavioral,
and cognitive paradigms should exist both
across cultures as well as within human
history. These social representations will
consequently affect observers’ judgments.
HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN CLASSIFICATION
Folktaxonomies and covert categories
A particularly compelling source of evi-
dence for the uncanny valley comes from
research into folktaxonomies. When we
encounter an organism, our knowledge
of folkbiological categories can cause us
to classify stimuli in terms of a species
(e.g., “fish”) or an ecological niche (e.g.,
“aquatic habitat”) that is available within
a folktaxonomic structure. While the pre-
ferred level of categorization within these
taxonomies differs between cultures (e.g.,
Rosch et al., 1976; Medin et al., 1997)
and expertise (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991;
Medin et al., 1997), such taxonomies form
the basis for all judgements of category
membership. In the context of this work,
we suggest that cognitive anthropological
research on folktaxonomies has revealed
uncanny valley-like phenomena in the
form of “covert categories”–categories that
cannot be readily placed into a taxonom-
ical structure (e.g., octopus). Covert cate-
gories are cognitively isolated from other
ontological categories (Berlin, 1974; Atran,
1983). For instance, informants might be
able to identify a number of basic-level
properties of an octopus, and yet be unable
to associate it with a superordinate cate-
gory (e.g., “fish”). In Berlin et al.’s (1968)
study of Tzetal Mayans’ folktaxonomies,
they found numerous covert groups that
did not fall into any of the major life-
form categories (this term is used in the
anthropological literature but is equiva-
lent to the superordinate level in the psy-
chological literature; c.f., Brown, 1974).
These categories are also associated with
aversive responses, such as food prohibi-
tions (Douglas, 1966/2002; Sperber, 1996).
For example, Henrich and Henrich (2010)
observed that the ambiguity in classify-
ing an octopus as a “fish” or “non-fish”
was associated with a food taboo. Douglas
(1957) also observed similar outcomes
with other ambiguous animals, like the
flying squirrel. Such responses to cate-
gorically ambiguous stimuli are consistent
with the uncanny valley hypothesis.
Anomalies: gods and monsters
Related to covert categories is the human
concern with biological anomalies, gods,
and monsters evidenced throughout
human history. In many cases, covert
categories might be the basis for these
ontological categories. As Sperber (1996)
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has pointed out in his discussion of
hybrids and monsters, such entities
tend to combine features from disparate
categories; ranging from the addition of
a single feature, such as unicorns which
are horses with a horn, to more elaborate
amalgams that combine multiple features,
such as theMinotaur andManticore which
share features from human and animal
categories. Representative of the cross-
cultural trend are Japanese mythological
creatures such as Tsuchigumo, a creature
that has the face of a demon, the legs of a
spider, and the body of a tiger.
Such mythological creatures might
reflect social representations that are the
products of cultural transmission. This
is evidenced by Mayor’s (2001, 2005)
study of how ancient peoples classified
fossilized creatures. Specifically, Mayor
noted that ancient peoples appear to
have understood fossils by assimilating
them into extant ontological categories. In
the absence of a clear understanding the
process of fossilization, they would have
perceived fossils as the scattered bones of
what were believed to be living species.
For instance, Mayor (2001) claims that
when the fossilized remains of a protocer-
atops were encountered, in an attempt to
account for the presence of these bones,
ancients inferred the existence of grif-
fons. Support for her argument is taken
from the co-localization of fossils and
reported observation of these creatures in
ancient times. To ancients, these mythical
creatures represented fearful stimuli that
were associated with distant unknown
territories inhabited by uncanny creatures.
Whereas fossil remains and unex-
plained natural events might help to
explain the origin of mythological crea-
tures (Mayor, 2001; Kaplan, 2012), along
with responses such as fear and anxiety
(also see Asma, 2009), the mechanisms
that support the retention of these crea-
tures in the modern mind requires further
explanation (e.g., Barrett and Keil, 1996).
Similar to the uncanny valley studies inves-
tigating categorization, studies of religious
beliefs assume that belief in such ontologi-
cal categories is a result of humans using
existing cognitive templates that have
exceptional features (Boyer, 1993, 2001).
A heightened sensitivity to these anoma-
lous stimuli, or so-called “counterintuitive
beliefs” (Boyer and Ramble, 2001; Atran
and Norenzayan, 2004), could be a result
of increases in negative affect associated
with the uncanny valley. These results
can be related back to the idea of dis-
tinctiveness in memory (e.g., Hunt and
Worthen, 2006), wherein the dissimilarity
of an item within a given context facili-
tates the encoding and retrieval of stim-
uli. The uncanny valley could also have
implications for recall that facilitates the
cultural transmission of knowledge. As in
the case of food taboos, such a negative
valence might reduce our willingness to
interact with features of our environment,
thereby further reducing our exposure to
a range of stimuli. An item’s distinctive-
ness in memory can thereby compound
an initial aversive response. Modern equiv-
alents are also evidenced in genetically
modified organisms that antagonist inter-
est groups have labeled “Frankenfoods,”
such as the transgenic tomato, which has
been engineered with a gene from the win-
ter flounder that makes it tolerant to freez-
ing temperatures. Such rhetorical devices
are clearly predicated on a fear of novel
hybrid organisms.
Human categories and out-group bias
A final form of cross-cultural evidence for
uncanny valley-like phenomena is the per-
ception of human groups. Much like some
non-human categories, unfamiliar human
groups might be construed as distinct
species. For instance, Gil-White (2001)
suggests that this could in fact be the
case for ethnicities. Identifying a race as
“sub-human” implicitly or explicitly can
be understood in these terms. For instance,
a low-frequency of exposure to out-
group members, or explicitly transmitted
out-group biases, could create negative
affective responses to features associated
with these individuals (for the effect of
stimulus frequency on affect, see Zajonc,
1968; Bornstein, 1989). Though contro-
versial, numerous studies have found evi-
dence for implicit negative associations
with minority groups (Greenwald et al.,
2009), which can be contrasted against
explicit biases to “lower” social classes,
and castes associated with “untoucha-
bility,” contamination, and food taboos
(Harper, 1964). Accounts of early explor-
ers encountering new tribes and peoples
for the first time are also consistent
with this possibility (e.g., Hall, 1992).
Prophylactic measures were taken when
entering strange lands inhabited by oth-
ers and ritual purification following con-
tact was needed to “guard against. . . the
magical arts of its inhabitants” (Frazer,
1922, p. 110; see also Douglas, 1966/2002).
For these explorers, the people that they
encountered were similar to them but the
comparatively small differences in terms of
physical and cultural variation produced
strong negative affective responses. As Hall
(1992) notes of travelers’ tales, features of
out-group members were sometimes even
perceived to reflect a blending of human
and non-human animal traits: “In the land
of Indian there are men with dogs’ heads.”
(quoted in Newby, 1975, p. 17).
A large degree of variation is also
observed in the number and nature of rei-
fied gender and sexual categories across
societies. Early First Nations societies in
North America often recognized three or
more sexes or genders and their asso-
ciated roles within the society (Herdt,
1994). In sharp contrast, the early defi-
nition of homosexuality as a disorder in
North American psychiatry reflects a per-
ceived “deviation” from socially defined
categories (Zucker, 2005). In the con-
text of the present review, the experiences
of homosexual, bisexual, and transgen-
dered persons could reflect their status
as a covert category in contemporary
North American society. For instance, as
described in a report by the San Francisco
Human Rights Commission (2011), the
experiences of bisexuals include being
“rendered invisible” and being seen as vec-
tors for the spread of sexually-transmitted
diseases. Similar claims could be made
concerning the historic status of women
in Western and Near Eastern societies.
For example, the unitary gender structure
in the mythology of Abrahamic religions
that sees Eve created from Adam’s rib,
framed the female sex as a derivative of
the male sex. When framed in terms of
deviation from a male reference category,
the uncanny valley might offer a plausible
basis for explaining negative affect and dis-
crimination toward women. While expo-
sure to male and female exemplars should
be present in a society with nearly equal
frequency, sociocultural practices can limit
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the exposure that one sex and gender
has to another. While frequency alone is
unlikely to account for all sex and gender
biases, inasmuch as it does make a con-
tribution it would support the existence
of an uncanny valley. An understanding of
the conditions in which the uncanny valley
occurs, and whether increased exposure
to low-frequency or negative-valence cate-
gories buffers against it, could facilitate our
understanding of intergroup conflicts, and
how they can be minimized. The codifica-
tion of third or multiple gender categories
minimally suggests that this is possible.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Considered individually, folkbiological
categories, biological anomalies and mon-
sters, as well as human categories represent
individual cultural products of human
categorization. Instead, we suggest that
the uncanny valley might reflect a pri-
mary response to unfamiliar or covert
categories. In the absence of having prior
knowledge of an individual or group, the
relative distinctiveness of a category, due
to a lower frequency of exposure, will
produce negative affect—an inversion
of the mere-exposure effect. The decep-
tive simplicity of learning mechanisms
can lead to important individual and
social consequences. If the uncanny val-
ley and its relation to negative affect is
a result of frequency of exposure, then
its amelioration can be facilitated by
increasing the frequency of the target
stimuli within the environment. The few
studies that have considered the relation-
ship between familiarity, discriminability,
and affect (Cheetham et al., 2013, 2014;
Burleigh and Schoenherr, 2014) need
to be complimented with more research
that systematically manipulates the fea-
tures of the ontological categories used for
comparison.
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